Register of Bear Harvest Quotas in Russia

The independent bear extermination register was created as part of the research work of Pavel Pashkov's projects. Its purpose is to compile official data on permitted bear hunting quotas across Russian regions in one place and to show how these figures change year by year.

Data is collected manually from official decrees and regulatory documents of regional authorities. For each region, the number of permitted quotas for hunting seasons is recorded. The current version of the register contains data from the 2019/2020 season to 2026/2027.

The register specifically shows the number of bears allowed to be hunted and reflects the scale of officially permitted hunting, allowing for regional comparisons, identifying sharp changes in quotas, and tracking dynamics over several years.

The project will be updated annually. Based on this data, regions can be studied separately, comparing quota increases with bear encounters with humans, forest fires, deforestation, land development, and other changes in the natural environment.

The bear is a large territorial predator that requires extensive and continuous natural areas, a stable food base, and a relatively low level of constant anthropogenic pressure. Therefore, what happens to bears is directly related to the condition of large forest ecosystems: habitat destruction, fires, logging, development of the wilderness, and reduction of the available food base.

At the same time, in various regions of Russia, there are reports of bears approaching humans and tragic conflicts. Against this backdrop, official quotas for their culling have significantly increased in many regions over recent years. The register itself shows the scale of this process: according to the collected official decrees of the regions, the number of bears permitted for culling increased from 24 405 in the 2019/2020 season to 52 074 in the 2026/2027 season.

This is why the situation surrounding bears holds special research significance for us. The dynamics of bear approaches to humans, conflicts, and permitted culling scales need to be compared with logging, forest fires, land development, and other changes in the natural environment. This allows the events concerning bears to be used as an indicator of what is happening with large natural systems as a whole.

The accurate number of brown bears in Russia is currently not established. Existing figures are estimates obtained by various methods, and the data published by government agencies, scientific organizations, and experts differ significantly.

The most significant discrepancy relates to 2017.

According to the Russian Ministry of Natural Resources, the number of brown bears was 245,1 thousand individuals.

At the same time, the Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian Federation reported that the number of brown bears decreased from 225,1 thousand individuals in 2015 to 143 thousand in 2017. The decrease was about 36%. The difference between the data from the Ministry of Natural Resources and the Prosecutor General's Office for the same year was 102,1 thousand animals.

The Prosecutor General's Office also pointed to the increase in allowed hunting amid declining numbers and raised the issue of including the brown bear in the Red Book of Russia.

In 2018, the FSB of Russia prepared proposals to include brown and Himalayan bears in the list of strategically important resources due to illegal hunting and smuggling of their parts. Subsequently, corresponding changes were made by the Government of the Russian Federation.

International data must also be considered separately.

In the assessment materials of the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) published in 2017, the number of brown bears in Russia was estimated at approximately 100 thousand individuals.

Thus, for one historical period, there were estimates of approximately 100 thousand, 143 thousand, and 245,1 thousand animals.

The difference between the minimum and maximum estimates exceeded 145 thousand individuals, meaning the maximum figure was approximately 2,45 times higher than the minimum.

Such discrepancies exclude the possibility of considering any of these figures as the result of an accurate nationwide count.

The issue of methodology has been known for a long time.

In Igor Chestin's work from 1994, dedicated to methods of counting brown bears in the USSR and Russia, the absence of a unified standard counting methodology was noted. Expert estimates, results of local surveys, and extrapolation of obtained data to much larger areas were used for large territories.

Chestin separately noted that large-scale methods are methods of estimation, not direct counting of numbers.

Data sources also varied between administrative territories. In some cases, expert estimates from hunting management workers were used, in others, the results of actual counts with subsequent extrapolation.

An estimate of approximately 130 thousand brown bears, attributed to the 1990s, was also not the result of a comprehensive count of animals across the country. It was formed based on available literature data, surveys, and other estimation methods.

Therefore, direct comparison of the figure of 130 thousand animals for 1990 with the modern figure of 307,9 thousand is methodologically limited. These values are not the results of a single standardized accounting system unchanged throughout the considered period.

In 2012, an international group of researchers using non-invasive genetic methods to study brown and Himalayan bears in the Russian Far East also pointed out the lack of reliable and consistent estimates of numbers and population densities.

The authors noted that Russian methods of estimating distribution and numbers were mainly based on expert data, track surveys, and visual observations. These methods were characterized as less rigorous compared to modern approaches based on repeated animal registrations and genetic identification.

In the example considered by researchers, a change in the spatial distribution of animals led to a shift in the population estimate by more than 200%. The reason was a change in the food situation and the movement of bears, not a corresponding change in the actual number of animals.

This is of fundamental importance. An increase in the number of tracks, registrations, or encounters cannot automatically be interpreted as a proportional increase in the overall population size.

In 2020, scientific literature again indicated that official reports on the number of brown bears in Russia should be treated with caution.

In 2021, the Federal Center for the Development of Hunting Management reported 300 147 brown bears.

Bear expert Mikhail Krechmar then noted the absence of a unified counting methodology and pointed to a possible error in such estimates at a level of no less than 20–25%.

With a figure of about 300 thousand individuals, an error of 25% corresponds to approximately 75 thousand animals.

In a scientific work from 2022, dedicated to brown bear attacks on humans in Russia, researchers used official data on numbers but directly indicated that they could not verify the reliability of these estimates.

In the same 2022, researcher Sergey Puchkovsky, analyzing the sources of growth in brown bear population figures in Russia, concluded that federal figures based on expert estimates are likely somewhat inflated.

Brown bear specialist Sergey Pazhetnov in 2022 estimated the number of Russian bears at approximately 120–130 thousand individuals.

Thus, at a time when official figures were already approaching 300 thousand animals, there was an expert estimate of approximately 120–130 thousand.

In 2023, Russian scientific materials also characterized the tracking of brown bears as subjective.

Materials from the Ministry of Natural Resources indicated that the brown bear, as a hibernating species, is not accounted for by the main method of winter route counting, which creates significant difficulties in determining numbers. The conclusion of specialist V. S. Pazhetnov was also cited, stating the impossibility of obtaining reliable population figures in this way.

As of 2026, the Ministry of Natural Resources reports 307,9 thousand brown bears and compares this estimate with a figure of about 130 thousand animals in 1990.

Arithmetically, the difference is 2,37 times, or approximately 136,8%.

However, such a calculation only shows the difference between two published estimates. It does not prove that the actual biological population size increased by exactly 2,37 times.

For such a conclusion, it is necessary that the initial and modern figures were obtained by comparable methods with known statistical error and confirmed reproducibility. The presented historical data do not meet these requirements.

The following sequence of estimates emerges from published materials:

about 100 thousand individuals — international IUCN estimate for Russia;

143 thousand — data from the Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian Federation for 2017;

245,1 thousand — data from the Russian Ministry of Natural Resources for 2017;

300 147 — figure from the Federal Center for the Development of Hunting Management in 2021;

about 120–130 thousand — expert estimate by Sergey Pazhetnov in 2022;

307,9 thousand — official estimate from the Ministry of Natural Resources for 2026.

The range of these figures is approximately from 100 thousand to 308 thousand animals.

With such a level of discrepancy, it cannot be asserted that the total number of brown bears in Russia is established with high accuracy.

There is also no basis to automatically interpret the growth of the official estimate as proven growth of the real population in the same proportions.

This is especially significant when using population data to determine the scale of hunting harvest.

Decisions to increase quotas, extend hunting periods, or other forms of additional animal removal should be based on verifiable information about numbers, density, age-sex structure, reproduction, mortality, and regional population dynamics.

The overall federal population estimate alone is insufficient for this.

A scientifically based monitoring system for brown bears should include unified standardized methods, statistically justified sampling design, error estimation, repeatability of studies, independent data verification, and the application of genetic methods in representative territories.

Until such data is obtained, the figure of 307,9 thousand individuals is correctly characterized as an official estimate of numbers, not as the established number of brown bears actually inhabiting the territory of Russia.

Therefore, the assertion that the number of brown bears in Russia has reliably increased from 130 thousand to 307,9 thousand individuals is not confirmed by existing data. Only the change in official estimates obtained in different periods with significant methodological limitations and substantial discrepancies between sources is confirmed.

One of the main reasons is the deterioration of habitat conditions and the reduction of the natural food supply. Forest fires, logging, development of the wild, road construction, and other infrastructure destroy and fragment the areas where bears live and feed.

When natural food is scarce, bears begin to move more and are more likely to approach populated areas. Additional factors include landfills, food waste, tourist campsites, leftover food, and other accessible food sources near humans.

A bear approaching people is not in itself evidence of an increase in their population. It may be a result of hunger, habitat destruction, reduction of the food base, and overall pressure on natural territories.

Therefore, the increase in conflicts should be considered along with data on forest fires, logging, economic development of territories, the state of the food base, and the scale of shooting. Only in combination do these data allow us to understand what is really happening with bears and their habitat.

For many years, there has been a lobbying campaign attempting to legalize winter hunting of bears while they are hibernating. This fact may largely be related to the expansion of bear hunting and the spread of panic about bears approaching humans.

In 2020, the Ministry of Natural Resources approved new Hunting Regulations and extended the autumn brown bear hunting season until 31 December. Previously, hunting ended on 30 November. For much of Russia, this is already a period of winter rest: bears usually hibernate in October–November, depending on the region, weather, and food supply.

In 2024, this regulation was challenged in the Supreme Court of Russia. The lawsuit explicitly stated that the deadline of 31 December allows animals to be hunted in their dens. The Ministry of Natural Resources cited natural and climatic differences, the timing of snow cover establishment, and the need to consider regional conditions. At the same time, the ministry officially acknowledged that regional authorities are capable of promptly considering local natural and climatic conditions and, if necessary, shortening the hunting season. Thus, a special mechanism for regional regulation already exists.

On 24 April 2024, the Supreme Court refused to cancel the hunting period until 31 December. And already on 24 May, just a month after the court's decision, the Ministry of Natural Resources posted a new draft amendment to the Hunting Regulations. This time, it was proposed to allow the hunting of brown bears from 1 July to 28 or 29 February, and Himalayan bears also until the end of February. In fact, this was about legalizing hunting throughout the entire winter hibernation.

In the materials accompanying the changes in hunting regulation, the development of the hunting industry was directly linked to increasing its investment attractiveness. This is not an accidental wording. In state regulation of the hunting industry, the indicator "investment attractiveness of activities in the field of hunting management" is officially established as one of the indicators of the hunting control system. It is calculated, in particular, through monetary fees for the use of wildlife objects when issuing permits for extraction. The state strategy for the development of the hunting industry also directly provides for ensuring the investment attractiveness of entrepreneurial activity in this area.

Against this background, extending bear hunting until the end of February acquires a very specific economic meaning. The bear is one of the most expensive objects of trophy hunting. Den hunting allows the location of the animal's wintering place to be discovered in advance, a client to be brought there, and an almost guaranteed encounter with a specific animal to be organized. This service is especially attractive for paid trophy hunting and hunting tourism.

The technology of this hunt has been known for a long time. A sleeping bear is forced to leave its shelter: dogs, long poles, noise, shots, and pyrotechnics are used. In the case of Himalayan bears, which winter in the hollows of old trees, methods with sawing or opening the shelter, as well as using smoke and fire to drive the animal out, are described. After the bear exits, it is shot directly near the den.

The winter period is especially dangerous for females. Cubs are born directly in the dens, usually in winter. From the outside, it is impossible to reliably determine whether a male, a pregnant female, or a female with newborn cubs is inside. Meanwhile, the current Hunting Regulations prohibit the hunting of females with cubs born in the current year. In practice, when opening or driving out of the den, this cannot be determined in advance.

Bear specialists opposed such changes for this very reason. It was pointed out that extending the hunt until the end of February would lead to the appearance of orphaned cubs only a few weeks or months old, which are unable to survive on their own. For the Himalayan bear, there is another problem: the destruction or damage of hollow trees destroys the very wintering and breeding shelters that animals can use for decades.

The 2024 project caused a massive negative reaction. On the federal portal of regulatory acts, it collected about 9,6 thousand negative ratings and more than 700 negative proposals and comments. The Public Chamber and bear specialists opposed it. After public pressure, the Ministry of Natural Resources stopped developing the project.

The sequence of events looks like this: first, the federal hunting period was extended to 31 December, then this regulation had to be defended in the Supreme Court, and almost immediately after the court decision, there was an attempt to extend the hunt until the end of February. At the same time, state policy in the field of hunting management is officially oriented, among other things, towards increasing the investment attractiveness of the industry.

Therefore, the commercial factor cannot be ignored here. Winter hunting turns a bear in its shelter into a convenient and expensive object of a paid trophy service. It is den hunting that creates the opportunity to sell the client not just a license, but a pre-organized hunt with a high probability of capturing a specific animal.

According to our register, the scale of permitted bear hunting in Russia has approximately doubled in recent years. After correcting data for the Irkutsk region, the working total for the 2019/2020 season is about 25,9 bears, while for the 2026/2027 season, the official quota is 52 074 bears. This is an increase of about 101%.

The growth was not strictly linear each year, but after a decline in the 2022/2023 season, each subsequent season set a new maximum: 2023/2024, 2024/2025, 2025/2026, and 2026/2027. In many individual regions, limits have increased several times over the years.

This process coincides with the commercialization of hunting management. According to Roslesinforg, almost 36 million hectares of forests have been transferred to private hunting enterprises — about a third of Russia's available forest lands. The agency pointed to approximately 1 300 private lessees and directly linked such enterprises with the development of paid hunting tourism.

For regions, hunting tourism is seen as a source of private investment, taxes, and income. Private hunting enterprises sell not only the right to hunt animals but also accommodation, guidance, transportation, ranger services, and the organization of hunts for specific species. In this system, the bear is one of the most expensive trophy hunting targets.

At the same time, the number of registered hunters in the country has reached about 5 million people. This figure has been repeatedly cited by representatives of relevant government agencies. However, this refers to holders of hunting licenses, not the five million people who necessarily go hunting every year.

Since the late 2010s, legislation has consistently expanded the opportunities for the hunting industry. Hunting with bows and crossbows was legalized, and sports and amateur hunting of animals in semi-free conditions and artificially created environments were regulated. Certain procedures for hunting users were simplified, and the Rules of Hunting and the timing of hunting certain species were changed.

Separately, hunting as a paid service has developed. Legislation explicitly allows the provision of services in the hunting sector, and state policy in the industry uses indicators of the investment attractiveness of hunting management. Against this backdrop, the increase in bear quotas cannot be viewed separately from the economics of the hunting industry. The more regions and private enterprises are interested in attracting hunting tourists, the higher the demand for permits, available hunting targets, and a stable volume of hunting resources.

According to our register, the permitted volumes of bear hunting have approximately doubled over several years. In many regions, limits have been consistently increased, and some entities have set new maximums for several consecutive years. Therefore, any statements about the need for further increases in hunting must be accompanied by a rigorous verification of the initial data on animal populations. In conditions where the hunting industry itself is interested in increasing the volume of hunting, the quality of accounting becomes crucial.

Bears are species with a slow life cycle and low reproductive rate. Females do not reach sexual maturity immediately, pregnancy lasts several months with the characteristic delayed implantation for bears, and cubs are born in the winter den.

Typically, a female bear gives birth to one to three cubs. After birth, the offspring stay with the mother for a long time, and a new pregnancy usually does not occur every year. The interval between litters is often several years. This means that the bear population is physically unable to recover quickly after a significant removal of adult animals. The death of adult females is particularly critical: with the loss of one female, the population loses not only that individual but also future generations she could have produced over many years.

Bears do not have a biological model for rapid reproduction. They are not a species capable of compensating for large losses in one or two seasons. Recovery of numbers takes years, and with constant high hunting pressure, habitat destruction, and reduced food supply, recovery may not occur at all.

The lack of pine nuts directly impacts the bear's food supply. Pine nuts are one of the important high-calorie foods, especially during the preparation for winter hibernation. In lean years or where pine forests are heavily harvested by people, bears lose a significant part of their autumn diet.

The problem is exacerbated by industrial harvesting. Pine forests in some regions are virtually stripped bare, and the collection is not for local consumption but in commercial volumes. In 2025 year, the export of pine nuts from Russia to China increased by 6,4 times. It was officially acknowledged that unscrupulous harvesters send organized teams into the forest to collect nuts in industrial quantities, using methods that damage the trees themselves.

For bears, this means a direct loss of food. But the chain doesn't end there. Pine nuts feed many other animals and birds. If the population of small and medium-sized species that depend on pine forests decreases, the available prey for predators also decreases. As a result, several levels of the food chain are disrupted.

A similar situation occurs with fish. In regions where bears depend on salmon and other fish, the construction of dams, hydraulic structures, changes in riverbeds, and blocking of migration routes reduce animals' access to natural spawning grounds. If fish do not move upstream, bears lose another major seasonal food source.

This is especially important before winter hibernation. Bears need to accumulate significant fat reserves. If the harvest of nuts, berries, and other plant foods decreases simultaneously, and access to fish is reduced, the animal begins to seek alternative food sources.

Then it approaches roads, settlements, dumps, tourist camps, and other places where food waste can be found. This does not prove that there are too many bears. In many cases, it shows that there is less available food in the natural environment.

There are also direct scientific observations. Studies of brown bears in Hokkaido noted that in years of sharp decline in pine nut and salmon consumption, bears were significantly more often seen near people, and among the animals, emaciated individuals were recorded. Researchers linked such occurrences directly to the deficit of natural food sources.

Therefore, the chain is simple: humans take the nuts, destroy or damage the pine forests, block rivers, reduce fish resources, cut down forests, and develop territory. The food supply decreases. Bears begin to move more. The number of encounters with people increases. After this, the consequences of habitat destruction are presented as evidence that there are too many bears.

We propose conducting a federal interagency audit of the bear situation in all regions where there is a simultaneous increase in conflicts with humans, rising quotas for culling, and significant pressure on natural territories. The audit should include data on forest fires, industrial and sanitary logging, road construction, mineral extraction, hydraulic structures, the state of spawning rivers, industrial harvesting of wild plants, the condition of cedar forests, landfills, tourist load, land use changes, and habitat fragmentation.

Every registered bear encounter with humans should be mapped and compared with territorial changes over previous years. If conflicts concentrate near recently logged forests, burned areas, blocked rivers, large landfills, or areas of intensive development, the state must investigate this connection. A separate audit is necessary for the animal accounting system itself. The data used to calculate harvest limits must undergo independent state verification. It is essential to prevent situations where population estimates are made by entities economically interested in increasing hunting volumes.

We propose conducting an independent federal re-evaluation of bear numbers using multiple methods simultaneously: camera traps, genetic analysis of biological material, route observations, data from scientific organizations, and TFET. Methodologies, source data, survey areas, and statistical errors should be published openly. Until such an audit is completed in regions with a sharp increase in conflicts or quotas, a moratorium on further increases in harvest limits should be imposed. If the state cannot reliably show how many animals are in the area and why they are increasingly approaching humans, expanding culling is unacceptable.

All cases of sharp increases in regional quotas should undergo separate scrutiny. A multiple increase in the limit must have a public biological justification that can be verified with primary data. Quotas cannot be increased solely based on claims of population growth. The region must provide data on population numbers, food base, habitat conditions, mortality, previous culling, and conflict dynamics.

A unified federal registry of human-bear conflicts is necessary. Each case should record coordinates, date, circumstances, animal condition, presence of a landfill or other food source, surrounding forest condition, nearby fires and logging, infrastructure, and the final decision regarding the animal. The killing of a specific animal posing an immediate threat to humans must be distinguished from the mass increase in hunting quotas. These are different tasks. Handling a dangerous animal should be conducted by specialized services after assessing the specific case circumstances.

A permanent ban on hunting bears in dens and any intentional destruction, opening, smoking, or other impact on winter shelters is necessary. The winter period should be completely excluded from commercial and sports hunting. In the most disturbed areas, territories of complete prohibition of sports hunting and economic intervention should be created, migration corridors and feeding areas restored, cedar forests protected from industrial depletion, fish passage in rivers restored, and sources of food waste that constantly attract animals to humans eliminated.

The economic aspect should be separately examined. If there is simultaneous growth in the officially declared animal population, hunting quotas, the number of commercial enterprises, and income from paid hunting, the state must eliminate conflicts of interest between population conservation and economic interest in increasing the number of animals available for harvest. The results of the federal audit should be fully published: maps, accounting methodologies, primary materials, population dynamics, habitat conditions, culling data, and reasons for each significant quota change.

The main task is to establish the cause of conflict growth. If a bear emerges from a destroyed, burned, or food-deprived environment, further destruction of animals does not eliminate the source of the problem. It only conceals the consequences of ecosystem destruction.

In 2026 year, there was indeed an increase in bear encounters with people in several regions of Russia. Simultaneously, a strong information campaign began: real incidents were mixed with old videos, materials from other countries, unverified reports, and outright fakes. Against this backdrop, representatives of the hunting community demanded a sharp relaxation of restrictions on brown bear hunting: removing quotas, extending the hunting season throughout the winter, increasing the validity of permits, and reducing financial restrictions on hunting.

On 30 September, it became known that the issue of removing the brown bear from the list of species whose hunting is regulated by quotas is already being officially considered. If this happens, annual limits and quotas on bear hunting will no longer be set in the same way. Society will lose one of the main tools of control — official data on how many bears are allowed to be killed in each region.

The sequence of events is clear: real problems with bear encounters, followed by mass hysteria and fakes, then demands from the hunting lobby to expand the killing of animals, and now — the government's consideration of removing key restrictions.